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Louis
O'Neill

A Wake-Up Call for the Kremlin

New York, New York

A Wake-Up Call for the Kremlin

By Louis O’Neill

The Moscow Times, April 10, 2009

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/376111.htm

http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?story_id=28761&action_id=2

For the first time in recent memory, the heavy hitters of international election monitoring — the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament — were in agreement with Russia-led observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States: Moldovan parliamentary elections on Sunday were run more or less in accordance with accepted norms.

Nonetheless, provocateur-instigated violence and vandalism broke out in Chisinau following massive, peaceful and spontaneous opposition protests. Shortly after the fires in the parliament were extinguished, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke of the “rare display of unity” by the two usually conflicting groups of election observers and added that the demand to hold a new vote was “absolutely groundless.”

Some might argue — as did Emma Nicholson, a British member of the European Parliament — that election violations were ignored because of Russia’s sway over the consensus-bound OSCE. But Western-sponsored exit polls run by a respected Moldovan political analyst showed the Communists winning 45 percent of the vote. This was outside the usual margin of error for such polling but not by a preposterous amount. The current count gives the Communists 49.48 percent of the vote and still leaves them one seat short of avoiding a coalition government. Even the notoriously skeptical commentator Vladimir Socor compiled a convincing “10 Reasons Why the Communist Party Won Moldova’s Elections Again,” only one of which mentioned the power of the incumbency and pre-electoral irregularities.

So the burden is now on the opposition parties to prove their allegations that thousands of “dead souls” voted for the Communists on Sunday. The Moldovan Central Election Commission has promised to open its books and voter lists to the opposition. Eventually someone will be declared the winner of these elections and will form a new parliament, which will in turn elect a new president.

Beyond the elections and protests, we are seeing an enormous demographic and generation shift — a trend not only in Moldova but in other former Soviet republics as they rediscover and reassert their national identities. According to exit polls, the majority of Moldovans who voted for the Communists were older, rural and less educated. They also had fond memories of the “stable times” when Moldova was a Soviet republic. Opposition voters tended to be young, urban, educated and more drawn toward Europe and an integrated future.

A similar split is visible in the demographics of Moldova’s breakaway, pro-Russian Transdnestr region, in contrast to the rest of Moldova, which leans more to the West. With each year, relations between the two regions become more estranged.

This schism in Moldova has profound implications for the region. It could also complicate U.S. efforts to “reset” relations with Russia — in particular, finding common ground in building a new European security architecture. On the other hand, the Transdnestr conflict is by far the most amenable to resolution of the “frozen conflicts.” A high-level, good-faith effort at resolving it in good faith could not only do much to develop the trust and substance that has for so long been lacking in U.S.-Russia relations but could actually advance the interests of both counties.

The United States, along with its European allies, wants a peaceful and democratic Europe. Russia wants to ensure security guarantees by, among other things, stopping NATO expansion and ensuring that it is surrounded by what it defines and perceives as friendly countries. Russia’s refusal to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transdnestr has complicated the ratification of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

The recent violence in Moldova has been a wake-up call for the Kremlin. It caught a disturbing glimpse of its nightmare scenario in which a pro-Romanian and pro-NATO government could come to power. Under this scenario, younger Moldovan leaders with no interest in reuniting with Transdnestr would be more ready to cut this troublesome sliver of land loose. Then they would race toward European political, economic and perhaps security integration, establishing another “pro-Western” nation on Ukraine’s border. This would leave the Kremlin with the responsibility of supporting an impoverished Transdnestr surrounded by an unfriendly Moldova and a divided Ukraine, creating an even bigger headache than it is now.

Historically, only a very small percentage of Moldovans has favored union with Romania, but that number is growing, especially among the young. This factor helps explain both Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Russia’s accusations of Romanian interference in the election process, instigation of the protests and escalation of them to violence.

The “5+2” framework to settle the Transdnestr dispute includes the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, EU, United States, Moldova and Transdnestr. In 2007, the Moldovan and Transdnestr chief negotiators to the 5+2 talks on the breakaway region’s settlement told me that if given the green light, they could resolve all the outstanding issues for settlement in about two weeks.

The Moldovan “comprehensive package” plan — which has never been rejected by Moscow and explicitly protects important Russian interests and institutions — could form a road map for progress in the 5+2 talks. But, as with any negotiations, creative flexibility would be needed.

This willingness to compromise for an overall good deal has also been noticeably absent from U.S.-Russia relations. A strong commitment to solve the Transdnestr conflict in a way that respects key interests of all sides could open an important new area of trust in relations between the United States, EU and Russia. It could also improve the lives of people living in both Transdnestr region and the surrounding areas of Moldova and help eliminate the persistent zero-sum thinking that seems so out of place in the 21st century.

Louis O’Neill was OSCE ambassador and head of mission to Moldova from 2006 to 2008.


Louis O'Neill's Publications

  • Chess, Poker and Kickboxing in Moldovan Politics, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 15, 2009
    April, 2010
    After hearing that his obituary has been published in “The New York Journal,” Mark Twain famously quipped, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”

    The same could be said of the death knell sounded for Moldova’s Communist Party (PCRM) by some excited analysts after its decision to boycott last week’s vote in parliament for a new president. Although the theory of a disoriented PCRM dissolving internally and melting away has a superficial appeal and some supporting evidence, there is a far more complex game playing out in Chisinau, combining elements of three-dimensional chess, no-limits poker, and bare-knuckled kickboxing.

    For sure, Communist leader and former President Vladimir Voronin has had to make a difficult adjustment: He now must play “black” pieces instead of “white,” reacting to political events rather than driving them. And it is likely that his general animosity toward the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) and particular dislike of defector Marian Lupu are at the forefront of his thinking.

    But at the end of the day the Communists’ entirely rational goal is to hang onto power by remaining indispensable to the Moldovan political process. If an analysis of the PCRM’s behavior is divorced from projections of emotionality or wishful thinking, it can be evaluated as a hard-headed but highly risky strategy.

    Closing Ranks

    Voronin and his team are betting the future of their party by – to use the poker expression – “going all in” with the expectation that they can outlast the AIE, fracture it into internal competition, retain a blocking minority in parliament, and find a willing coalition partner. Either the PCRM will succeed in dividing and conquering its rivals and will continue as the decisive, anchoring element of a governing coalition, or it will face the voters’ wrath and be severely punished for standing in the way of Moldova’s European future.

    The Communists selected this strategy because they understand two things. First, that time is running out on their party and that their current “brand” is now a wasting asset. Demographic reality dictates that in a fair fight the sum of seats going to the PCRM will continue to decline, as it has from 71 in 2001 to 56 in 2005 to 48 in 2009. They are counting, however, on still having enough momentum to garner at least 41 seats in new elections, making it impossible for any ruling coalition to form without them.

    Second, Voronin and his top advisers know Moldova’s political history well, having shaped much of it themselves in one way or another since independence. They are mindful of the difficulty in Moldova of holding together a broad multiparty coalition; most alliances have fallen apart under the weight and ambitions of their constituent parts. That the four-party AIE has maintained a united front this long marks an exception in Moldova’s political culture.

    There is already evidence of public fissures on both sides, but whether these cracks will lead to a collapse remains to be seen. For example, April’s infamous flag-man Vladimir Turcan – who is a member of the Communists’ parliamentary faction but not the party itself – has announced that he and others will leave the PCRM’s orbit to protest the party’s boycott of the Lupu vote. Without giving a figure, Turcan claimed recently that a number of Communists deputies had also been ready to support Lupu, but lacked the courage (as did Turcan himself) to remain in parliament when Voronin herded his party out the door during the vote.

    That Voronin was still able to exert this kind of discipline over his faction is revealing. If the PCRM’s grouping in parliament really felt that the boycott strategy reflected an irrational vendetta against the AIE that would destroy their country, their party, and their livelihood, surely eight faction members would have found the stomach to oppose it publicly. And even the theory that Voronin holds “kompromat” files on many PCRM members and associates, controversially advanced last month by Valeriu Pasat, is insufficient to explain the full-team walkout. After all, the Communists’ ability to bring politically motivated cases has been diminished with the AIE in charge. It simply means that the PCRM was offering its people something more attractive than standing up and being counted with the AIE.

    Escalation

    On the other side of the aisle, an AIE constituent party – the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) – appears to be in free fall. When Veaceslav Untila challenged eternal AMN head Serafim Urechean for the top spot at a recent party congress, the AMN was also shaken by a protest and walkout, as the youth wing left the meeting (and possibly the party) over alleged procedural violations. Urechean was overwhelmingly reelected by those deputies remaining, but Untila promised to contest the outcome—and the way the AMN is run—with the Justice Ministry. These are exactly the kinds of tensions that the PRCM is seeking to exacerbate and exploit by dragging out Moldova’s political drama.

    And the rhetoric on both sides has turned even uglier, taking on a fight-to-the-death quality. Prime Minister Vlad Filat lamented that the AIE “hadn’t done everything possible” to get Lupu elected, “being excessively permissive” with the Communists. In clarifying what he meant, Filat again invoked the raw power of political prosecutions for winning the day: “We need to be more incisive and let the law enforcement organs do their work.” Thus, the country’s prime minister suggested that negotiations over electing Lupu failed because the AIE provided “insufficient motivation” for the Communists, including not having criminal cases ready over the “illegalities committed by the previous [Communist] government.”

    Certainly attempting or threatening to jail one’s opponents can be an effective way of gaining power, but the alliance ran on a platform of change, not a continuation of the bludgeoning kompromat policies of the PCRM. Filat concluded that if “we, the AIE, have occasion to dismember the PCRM, we must do it,” a sentiment echoed by Urechean, who is also the parliament’s deputy speaker: “We will do everything possible to destroy this party.” So much for negotiations.

    Voronin answered in kind. Speaking recently on NIT’s program “Resonance,” the Communist leader taunted the AIE, calling acting President Mihai Ghimpu the best “agitator” for the PRCM because “the more he speaks the more our rating grows.” Voronin derided the “Aliansul za Evro” (“Alliance for the Euro” uttered in pure “Moldovan,” a grammatical mix of Russian and Romanian) and then turned forebodingly serious, saying it had brought “criminals” into parliament and would betray Moldovan “interests…and attack the nation’s sovereignty and identity,” hinting that the AIE’s dramatic improvement of relations with Romania could result in the end of Moldova as an independent country.

    The ‘Nuclear Option’

    Lupu, meanwhile, successfully resisted the temptation to take a last-minute deal offered by the Communists to form a new governing majority (together the Communists and Lupu’s Democrats would have had enough votes to make him president). Part of the Communist strategy, then, will be to shuffle the cards through repeat elections and see which parliamentary hand gets dealt. Next time, someone else (don’t forget Iurie Rosca’s unexpected arrangement with the PCRM in 2005 which led to Voronin’s reelection as president) may well hold a joker and be ready to form a coalition with the Communists in return for a fancy position and other benefits.

    This explains in part why the PRCM is pushing for an immediate dissolution of parliament following the second failure to elect a president. It is advancing, among other arguments, the notion that parliament can only be dissolved once in a calendar year, meaning it could happen as early as January 2010 (the Communists don’t accept what they consider the AIE’s self-serving interpretations of the constitution on this issue and want the Constitutional Court to weigh in). The AIE, on the other hand, is enjoying the levers of influence and use of administrative resources, and thus wants to drag the status quo out for as long as possible to cement its hold on power. Therefore, the alliance says that the constitution means that parliament can only be dissolved again one full year after the dissolution of the last parliament. This would be in June 2010, leading to elections next fall.

    Which brings us around again to the AIE’s oft-threatened nuclear option – amending the constitution to get out of the political crisis. Ghimpu stated categorically on the talk show “In Profunzime” last week that “no early parliamentary elections will take place,” because he will insist on the adoption of a new constitution to avoid them. By skipping out on the Lupu vote, the Communists have dramatically increased the odds that the AIE will indeed press the “red button” and launch this process. But that move will lead to an even greater escalation in the level of vitriol and legal wrangling, with unforeseeable consequences.

    At this point, there may, unfortunately, be no other way out. Ghimpu has been talking for weeks about the ‘aces up his sleeve.’ Slapping them on the table is cheating in poker, but in Moldova’s hybrid politics, anything goes.

    Louis O’Neill was OSCE ambassador and head of mission to Moldova from 2006-08. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL